Abstract. In many situations, both in human and artificial societies, cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity and it is not uncommon that certain actions are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria, e.g., to sufficiently large coalitions or coalitions which involve players of sufficient seniority. Simmons (1988) formalized this idea in the context of secret sharing schemes by defining the concept of a (disjunctive) hierarchical access structure. Tassa (2007) introduced their conjunctive counterpart. From the game theory perspective access structures in secret sharing schemes are simple games. In this paper we prove the duality between disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical games. We introduce a canonical representation theorem for both types of hierarchical games and characterize disjunctive ones as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition. We give a short combinatorial proof of the Beimel-Tassa-Weinreb (2008) characterization of weighted disjunctive hierarchical games. By duality we get similar theorems for conjunctive hierarchical games.
Introduction
In many situations cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity. In the theory of simple games developed by (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944 ) seniority of players is modeled by giving them different weights. Such situation arise, for example, in the context of corporate voting when different shareholders have different number of shares. The access structure in secret sharing schemes (Simmons, 1990; Stinson, 1992) can also be modeled by a simple game, but in this theory a different approach in defining seniority is often used. To this end (Simmons, 1990) introduced the concept of a hierarchical access structure. Such an access structure stipulates that agents are partitioned into m levels, and a sequence of thresholds k 1 < k 2 < . . . < k m is set, such that a coalition is authorized if it has either k 1 agents of the first level or k 2 agents of the first two levels or k 3 agents of the first three levels etc. Consider, for example, the situation of a money transfer from one bank to another. If the sum to be transferred is sufficiently large, this transaction must be authorized by three senior tellers or two vice-presidents. However, two senior tellers and a vice-president can also authorize the transaction. These hierarchical structures are called disjunctive, since only one of the m conditions must be satisfied for a coalition to be authorized. If all conditions must be satisfied, then the hierarchical access structure is called conjunctive. A typical example of a conjunctive hierarchical game would be the United Nations Security Council where for the passage of a resolution all five permanent members must vote for it and also at least nine members in total.
It has been shown that these two approaches are seldom equivalent since hierarchical access structures are seldom weighted. Both (Beimel, Tassa, & Weinreb, 2008) and (Farràs & Padró, 2010) characterized weighted disjunctive hierarchical access structures as a part of their characterization of weighted ideal access structures. They showed that, beyond two levels, disjunctive hierarchical structures are normally non-weighted. This is extremely interesting from the gametheoretic point of view, since we now have a natural class of non-weighted access structures and hence simple games. However, the proof of this characterization in both papers was indirect. They used the fact that hierarchical access structures are ideal (E. F. Brickell, 1990 ) and the well-known relation between ideal secret sharing schemes and matroids (E. Brickell & Davenport, 1990) . Conjunctive hierarchical access structures, which were introduced in (Tassa, 2007) , have got much less attention. We will use the game-theory methods and terminology, and we will talk about hierarchical games, not access structures.
Progress in studying hierarchical games was hindered by the absence of any canonical representation, which is needed since different values of parameters can give us the same game. In this paper we introduce a canonical representation of hierarchical games, and give a short combinatorial proof of the Beimel-TassaWeinreb characterization theorem by using the technique of trading transforms developed in (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) . Our statement is slightly more general, as it allows for the existence of dummy players. We also characterize disjunctive hierarchical games as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalitions. Then we prove the duality between disjunctive and conjunctive games. This allows us to characterize weighted conjunctive hierarchical games and obtain their structural characterization as complete games with a unique shiftminimal winning coalition. The class of complete games with a unique shiftminimal winning coalition was studied in its own right in (Freixas & Puente, 2008) . However, they did not notice that the games which they study are hierarchical conjunctive games.
Preliminaries
The background material on simple games can be found in (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) . Definition 1. Let P = [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players and let ∅ = W ⊆ 2 P be a collection of subsets of P that satisfies the following property:
(1)
In such case the pair G = (P, W ) is called a simple game and the set W is called the set of winning coalitions of G. Coalitions that are not in W are called losing.
Due to the monotonic property (1) the subset W is completely determined by the set W min of minimal winning coalitions of G. A player who does not belong to any minimal winning coalition is called a dummy. Such a player can be removed from any winning coalition without making it losing.
Definition 2. A simple game G = (P, W ) is called a weighted majority game if there exist nonnegative weights w 1 , . . . , w n and a threshold q such that
In secret sharing, weighted threshold access structures were introduced by (Shamir, 1979) . A distinctive feature of many games is that the set of players is partitioned into subsets, and players in each of the subsets have equal status. We suggest analyzing such games with the help of multisets. Given a simple game G we define a relation ∼ G on P by setting i ∼ G j if for every set X ⊆ P not containing i and j X ∪ {i} ∈ W ⇐⇒ X ∪ {j} ∈ W.
Lemma 1. ∼ G is an equivalence relation.
Example 1. Suppose we have P = {a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , c 1 } as the full set of players with weights as follows: a 1 and a 2 have weights 1, b 1 has weight 2 and c 1 has weight 3. Then the following is the set of minimal winning coalitions for the game with q = 3.
This gives a 1 ∼ G a 2 and of course a 2 ∼ G a 1 as ∼ is symmetric. Since ∼ is reflexive, then a i ∼ a i for i = 1, 2, and also
It follows that our equivalence classes are {a 1 , a 2 }, {b 1 } and {c 1 }.
We need now the notion of a multiset.
into the set of non-negative integers. It is often written in the form
The existence of large equivalence classes relative to ∼ G allows us to compress the information about the game. This is done by the following construction. Let now G = (P, W ) be a game and ∼ G be its corresponding equivalence relation.
Then P can be partitioned into a finite number of equivalence classes P = P 1 ∪ P 2 ∪ . . . ∪ P m relative to ∼ G and suppose that |P i | = n i . Then we put in correspondence to the set of agents P a multisetP = {1 n1 , 2 n2 , . . . , m nm }. We take our base set P , identify those agents which are equivalent and we do not distinguish between them any further. We carry over the game structure toP as well by defining the set of submultisetsW ⊆P by assuming that a submultiset Q = {1 1 , 2 2 , . . . , m m } is winning inḠ if a subset of P containing i agents from P i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m), is winning in G. This definition is correct since the sets P i are defined in such a way that it does not matter which i players from P i are involved. We will callḠ = (P ,W ) the canonical representation of G.
n1 , 2 n2 , . . . , m nm } andW is a system of submultisets of the multisetP is said to be a simple game onP if
So the canonical representation of a simple game on a set of players P is a simple game on the multisetP . We will omit bars when this does not invite confusion.
Given a game G on a set of players P we may also define a relation G on P by setting i G j if for every set X ⊆ U not containing i and j
That is known as Isbel's desirability relation (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) . The game is called complete if G is a total (weak) order. We also define the relation i G j as i G j but not j G i.
Definition 5. We say thatḠ = (P ,W ) is a weighted majority game if there exist non-negative weights w 1 , . . . , w m and q ≥ 0 such that
If G is weighted, then it is well-known (see, e.g., (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) , p.91) that we can find a weighted representation, for which equivalent players have equal weights. Hence we obtain Proposition 1. A simple game G = (P, W ) is a weighted majority game if and only if the corresponding simple gameḠ = (P ,W ) is.
One of the most interesting classes of complete games is hierarchical games. They can be of two types ( (Beimel et al., 2008) , (Tassa, 2007) ), and they will be considered in the next section.
If a game G is complete, then we define shift-minimal (δ-minimal in (Carreras & Freixas, 1996) ) winning coalitions and shift-maximal losing coalitions. By a shift we mean a replacement of a player of a coalition by a less desirable player which did not belong to it. Formally, given a coalition X, player p ∈ X and another player q / ∈ X such that q ≺ G p, we say that the coalition (X \ {p}) ∪ {q} is obtained from X by a shift. A winning coalition X is shift-minimal if every coalition contained in it and every coalition obtained from it by a shift are losing. A losing coalition Y is said to be shift-maximal if every coalition that contains it is winning and there does not exist another losing coalition from which Y can be obtained by a shift.
The definition of a shift in the multiset context must be adapted as follows.
Definition 6. Let G be a complete simple game on a multiset P = {1 n1 , . . . , m nm },
has i ≥ 1 and j < n j for some i < j. Then we will say that the submultiset
is obtained from A by a shift.
Shift-minimal winning and shift-maximal losing coalitions are then defined straightforwardly.
For X ⊂ P we will denote its complement P \ X by X c .
Definition 7. Let G = (P, W ) be a simple game and A ⊆ P . Let us define subsets
Then the game G
Proposition 2. Every subgame and every reduced game of a weighted majority game is also a weighted majority game.
Let us discuss briefly duality in games. The dual game of a game G = (P, W ) is defined as G * = (P, L c ). Equivalently, the winning coalitions of the game G * dual to G are exactly the complements of losing coalitions of G. We have G = G * * . We note also that, If A ⊆ P , then:
Moreover, the operation of taking the dual is known to preserve weightedness. We will also use the fact that Isbel's desirability relation is self-dual, that is x G y if and only if x G * y. All these concepts can be immediately reformulated for the games on multisets.
Let us remind the reader of some more facts from the theory of simple games. The sequence of coalitions
is called a trading transform if the coalitions X 1 , . . . , X j can be converted into the coalitions Y 1 , . . . , Y j by rearranging players. In other words, for any player p the cardinality of the set {i | p ∈ X i } is the same as the cardinality of the set {i | p ∈ Y i }. We say that the trading transform T has length j.
Theorem 1 ( (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) ). A game G = (P, W ) is a weighted majority game if for no j does there exist a trading transform (5) such that X 1 , . . . , X j are winning and Y 1 , . . . , Y j are losing.
This theorem gives a combinatorial way to prove the existence of weights for a given game.
Definition 8. Let G = (P, W ) be a simple game. A trading transform (5) where all X 1 , . . . , X j are winning in G and all Y 1 , . . . , Y j are losing in G is called certificate of non-weightedness for G.
For complete games the criterion can be made easier to check, by the following result.
Theorem 2 ( (Freixas & Molinero, 2009) 
Canonical Representations and Duality of Hierarchical Games
Definition 9 (Disjunctive Hierarchical Game). Suppose that the set of players P is partitioned into m disjoint subsets P = ∪ m i=1 P i and let k 1 < k 2 < . . . < k m be a sequence of positive integers. Then we define the game H = H ∃ (P, W ) by setting
From the definition it follows that any disjunctive hierarchical game H is complete, moreover for any i ∈ [m] and u, v ∈ P i we have u ∼ H v. However, for arbitrary values of parameters we cannot guarantee that the canonical representationH of H will be defined on the multisetP = {1 n1 , 2 n2 , . . . , m nm }, since it is possible to have less than m equivalence classes. The next theorem shows when this does not happen. Theorem 3. Let H be a disjunctive hierarchical game defined on the set of players P partitioned into m disjoint subsets P = ∪ m i=1 P i , where n i = |P i |, by a sequence of positive thresholds k 1 < k 2 < . . . < k m . Then the canonical representationH of H has m equivalence classes, and hence it is defined on P = {1 n1 , 2 n2 , . . . , m nm } if and only if (a) k 1 ≤ n 1 , and (b) k i < k i−1 + n i for every 1 < i < m.
When (a) and (b) hold the sequence (k 1 , . . . , k m−1 ) is determined uniquely. Moreover, H does not have dummies if and only if k m < k m−1 + n m ; in this case k m is determined uniquely as well. If k m ≥ k m−1 + n m the last mth level consists entirely of dummies.
Proof. As we know, players within each P i are equivalent. We note that if k 1 > n 1 , then P 1 ∼ H P 2 . On the other hand, if k 1 ≤ n 1 , then any k 1 players from P 1 form a winning coalition M 1 which ceases to be winning if we replace one of them with a player of P 2 yielding P 1 ∼ H P 2 . Suppose that we know already that P i−1 ∼ P i for some i < m, and that there is a minimal winning coalition M i−1 contained in ∪ i−1 j=1 P j which intersects P i−1 nontrivially and consists of k i−1 players. If k i ≥ k i−1 + n i , and a coalition Q ⊆ ∪ i j=1 P j is winning and has a nonzero intersection with P i , then we also have |Q ∩ ∪ i−1 j=1 P j | ≥ k i−1 and hence Q ∩ ∪ i−1 j=1 P j is also winning. Then any player of P i in Q can be replaced by any player of P i+1 without Q becoming losing, i.e., P i H P i+1 . From the definition of hierarchical game we have P i H P i+1 , this implies P i ∼ H P i+1 . On the other hand, if k i < k i−1 + n i , we see that a minimal winning coalition in ∪ i j=1 P i exists which intersects with P i nontrivially and consists of k i players. For constructing it we have to take k i players of the ith level (if they are available) and, if their number is less than k i add k i − n i players from M i−1 . We note that the number of players needed to be added is less than k i−1 , which makes M i minimal. As above, the existence of such coalition this implies
The uniqueness of (k 1 , . . . , k m−1 ) (and also k m in case k m < k m−1 + n m ) follows from the fact that these numbers are exactly the cardinalities of minimal winning coalitions inH.
By H ∃ (n, k) we will denote the m-level disjunctive hierarchical game canonically represented by n = (n 1 , . . . , n m ) and k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) with k m = k m−1 + n m in the case where the last level consists of dummies. Every new level, except maybe the last one, adds a new class of minimal winning coalitions. Corollary 1. Let G = H ∃ (n, k) be an m-level disjunctive hierarchical game. Then we have n i > 1 for every 1 < i < m.
Proof. If n i = 1 for some 1 < i < m, then (b) cannot hold.
We note that the first and the last mth level are special. If k 1 = 1, then every user of the first level is self-sufficient (passer) and its presence makes any coalition winning and if k m ≥ k m−1 + n m , then the mth level consists entirely of dummies.
Definition 10 (Conjunctive Hierarchical Game). Suppose that the set of agents P is partitioned into m disjoint subsets P = ∪ m i=1 P i , and let k 1 < . . . < k m−1 ≤ k m be a sequence of positive integers. Then we define the game H ∀ (P, W ) by setting
The following result was mentioned in (Tassa, 2007, Proposition 4 .1) without a proof. Since it is our main tool here we provide a proof below.
Theorem 4. Let n = (n 1 , . . . , n m ) and k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ). Then for an m-level hierarchical games H ∃ (n, k)
Proof. We will prove only the first equality. As Isbel's desirability relation is self-dual, the canonical representation of H ∃ (n, k) * will involve the same equivalence classes and hence it will be defined on the same multiset. Let
. We need also to show that the complement of every winning in H ∃ (n, k) coalition is losing in H ∀ (n, k * ). Consider a coalition X = {1 1 , 2 2 , . . . , m m } which is winning in H ∃ (n, k). It means that there is an i ∈ [m] such that j∈[i] j ≥ k i . But then the condition
holds. Thus, the complement X c = {1 n1− 1 , 2 n2− 2 , . . . , m nm− m } is losing in H ∀ (n, k * ).
We note a certain duality for the second parameter as k * * = k.
Theorem 5. Let H be a conjunctive hierarchical game defined on the set of agents P partitioned into m disjoint subsets P = ∪ m i=1 P i , where n i = |P i |, by a sequence of positive thresholds k 1 < . . . < k m−1 ≤ k m . Then the canonical representationH of H has m equivalence classes and, hence, it is defined on P = {1 n1 , 2 n2 , . . . , m nm } if and only if (a) k 1 ≤ n 1 , and (b) k i < k i−1 + n i for every 1 < i ≤ m.
When ( Proof. This is a direct consequence of duality and Theorem 3. Indeed we have k * i < k * i−1 + n i if and only if k i−1 < k i and k * 1 ≤ n 1 is equivalent to k 1 > 0, k * 1 > 0 is equivalent to k 1 ≤ n 1 and k * i−1 < k * i is equivalent to k i < k i−1 + n i . To prove the second statement we use duality and the fact that k * * = k.
We will need the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. Let n = (n 1 , . . . , n m ), k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) and G = H ∃ (n, k). If n = (n 1 , . . . , n m−1 ), k = (k 1 , . . . , k m−1 ), then H(n , k ) is a subgame G A of G for A = {m nm }.
